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CONFRONTING PROXY CRIMINALIZATION
ANNIE LAIt

ABSTRACT

Though state laws that directly criminalize unlawful presence have
been struck down in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United States, the criminalization of immigrants continues unabated. This Article examines one form of criminalization, criminalization by
"proxy," by which state and local governments are punishing conduct by
undocumented immigrants linked closely to their social and economic
survival. More ubiquitous than previously understood, such measures
have eluded constitutional scrutiny, confounding the legally constructed
line between "civil" and "criminal" and the legally constructed distinction between "immigration crimes" and "other crimes." But, as this Article observes, they are no less pernicious than direct criminalization as a
vessel for antipathy towards immigrants and their impact on communities no less profound.
Using state driver's license schemes as a paradigmatic example of
subfederal proxy criminalization of migration, the Article argues that
states should not be permitted to use their police powers to punish undocumented status simply because the laws they use are focused as a
formal matter on conduct rather than status and tend to be rules of general applicability. The Article looks to the experience of another group
that has long been subject to proxy criminalization at the local levelpoor people who fall into homelessness-and courts' analysis of local
ordinances to limit their use of public space under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause, to reveal transsubstantive
lessons. It concludes by discussing the implications of a more nuanced
conception of states' role in the management of migration.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2010, undocumented college student Jessica Colotl was stopped
by campus police in Kennesaw, Georgia, and later taken to the Etowah
Detention Center in Alabama to await deportation.' A longtime resident
who had immigrated to the United States from Mexico with her family as
a child, Ms. Colotl did not fit many people's notions of the type of per2
son who should be banished from the country. Her arrest sparked a national discussion about the dangers of entrusting local police with immigration enforcement powers at a time when the nation was still grappling
with the implications of Arizona's then-new stringent immigration law,
S.B. 1070.' Fellow students, advocacy groups, and even her university
president lobbied on her behalf, and eventually U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) granted the young DREAMer one year of
"deferred action." 4
It has been five years since Ms. Colotl's arrest, and a great deal has
changed. Several key programs to deputize state and local law enforcement agents as immigration police have been partially dismantled as a

I.

Robbie Brown, Student's Arrest Tests Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010, at

A14.
2.
Id.
3. The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act of 2010, S. 1070, 49th
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.R. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010)
(Among other things, the omnibus measure imposed obligations on local law enforcement to enforce
federal immigration law and attempted to create new immigration-based crimes and powers at the
local level.).
4.
Id. Deferred action is a discretionary, temporary deferral of deportation that authorizes an
individual to remain in the United States and apply for work authorization.
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result of public scrutiny.

The Supreme Court invalidated substantial
portions of S.B. 1070 in Arizona v. United States.6 And thanks to the

political activism of DREAMer and others, young people like Ms. Colotl
can now apply for deferred action prior to arrest through the Deferred
7
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. But in other ways,
things have remained the same. Ms. Colotl was initially taken into custody for driving without a license because her undocumented status pre-

cluded her from obtaining a driver's license under Georgia law.8 Like the
great majority of other states, Georgia treated operating a motor vehicle

without a license as a criminal misdemeanor offense.9 Even today, the
majority of states continue to effectively punish undocumented immigrants for driving.
A full-throated critique of the indirect criminalization of immigrants
through state laws such as Georgia's driver's license scheme is long
overdue. Attaching criminal sanctions to conduct that immigrants must
engage in as a result of their status is no less a perversion of state criminal justice systems than making their status itself a crime, and states

should not be permitted to do indirectly what courts have already said
they cannot do directly. Nevertheless, as Juliet Stumpf has noted, such
indirect schemes to punish immigrants present a "harder case[]" for doc-

trinal analysis because they tend to evoke generally applicable criminal
law.o Indeed, it is a well-established principle of preemption law that
state laws are not preempted merely because they may have an incidental

5.
See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidance to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlightsfocus-key-priorities-and (announcing that ICE would stop renewing 287(g) task force agreements

with state and local agencies); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
Megan Mack, Officer, Office of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Philip A. McNamara, Assistant
Sec'y for Intergovernmental Affairs, on Secure Cmtys. (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_ 1120_memosecure communities.pdf [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum] (announcing certain changes to immigration detainers in response to
widespread resistance to the Secure Communities program).
6.
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-05 (2012) (upholding injunction of Sections 3 and 5(C) of S.B.
1070, which created a new state misdemeanor for failing to comply with federal registration laws
and for performing or soliciting work as an unauthorized immigrant, respectively).
7. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David
V. Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (Jun. 15, 2012), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-cane-to-us-as-children.pdf (establishing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program).
8. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-21.2 (2010); Brown, supra note 1.
9.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
10.
Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Inmigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1610-12 (2008) (explaining that courts have been inclined to view
measures that have a parallel to generally applicable criminal statutes as touching not on the prohibited field of immigration but on the traditionally state-regulated field of criminal law).
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effect on immigrants living in the interior of the country." But what
about criminal laws that, while ostensibly neutral, have a profound and
harmful effect on the immigrant community? Preemption law alone does
not provide a satisfying answer, and the existing scholarly literature does
not offer a framework to assess their legal validity.
This Article seeks to add to the literature by locating a form of indirect criminalization of immigrants' undocumented status that I will describe as criminalization by "proxy." Proxy criminalization, as I use the
term, refers to state and local governments' use of their police powers to
punish undocumented communities for activities linked to their social
and economic survival rather than directly based on status.' 2 Though
proxy criminalization is focused as a formal matter on conduct rather
than status, and tends to rely on laws of general applicability, it should be
no less tolerated by policymakers and courts. I draw on the experience of
another group that has long been subject to its own form of proxy criminalization at the local level-the homeless-to illustrate the limits of the
conduct/status distinction as a measure for the legitimacy of criminal
laws, especially where the state has a role in forcing the conduct onto a
discrete group based on status.
The remainder of this Article will proceed in three parts. Part II
traces the development of subfederal proxy criminalization in the immigration context, a phenomenon that is more ubiquitous than previously
understood. It summarizes current doctrine disapproving direct attempts
by states to punish immigrants and presents state driver's license
schemes as a paradigmatic example of an effort to criminalize immigrants by proxy. As part of this analysis, I catalogue state laws that impose criminal punishment for driving without a license and further expound on the harms of proxy criminalization. Part III then turns to other
areas of the law where proxy criminalization occurs to reveal transsubstantive lessons. Specifically, I analogize proxy criminalization of immigrants to municipalities' use of local ordinances to limit the use of public
space by homeless residents and courts' analysis of those ordinances
under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Part IV previews the implications of a more nuanced conception of prohibited state uses of criminal law in the management of migration.
I. SUBFEDERAL PROXY CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION

Juliet Stumpf has observed that a state acts at the height of its power
when it joins criminal lawmaking authority with the plenary powers as-

11.

See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).

12.
Examples include state driver's license laws that criminalize driving without a license as
well as laws that punish undocumented immigrants for the use of false documents to work. See infra

Parts I.B, IV.

2015]

CONFRONTING PROXY CRIMINALIZATION

883

sociated with immigration law.' 3 Plenary power grants federal officials
the ability to make distinctions between citizens and non-citizens, and
between groups of non-citizens.1 4 When exercised jointly with criminal
law, it exacts substantial deprivations of liberty at a lower procedural
price tag.' 5 Indeed, enforcement of criminal laws is increasingly linked to
deportation-either because contact with the criminal justice system will
lead to detection by federal authorities' 6 or because a criminal conviction
can itself trigger immigration consequences. Perhaps for these reasons,
courts deciding Supremacy Clause claims have shown increasing intolerance for state laws that criminally punish unlawful presence directly.' 8
Nevertheless, states' participation in less visible proxy criminalization that likewise exacts a high human cost continues largely unabated.
In this section, I review the rationales put forth for limiting state involvement in the punishment of immigrants, trace the history and structure of state driver's license schemes to show how they have become a
paradigmatic form of proxy criminalization, and chart some additional
harms associated with proxy criminalization illuminated by the driver's
licenses example.
A. The Casefor Limiting State Involvement in the Criminalizationof
Immigrants
State laws that criminally punish unlawful presence directly have
generally been met with skepticism in the modem era. This is based on a
recognition that subfederal measures that impose burdens on immigrants
are often borne out of antipathy or majoritarian disfavor towards immigrants, particularly immigrants of color.1 9 Though state and local civil
Stumpf, supra note 10, at 1613-16 (concluding that such exercises of power should be
13.
viewed with disfavor). See also Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1257, 1258-59 (2014) (noting, in the context of federal regulation of migration through criminal
law, how crimes of migration combine two of the most coercive and distinctly violent practices the
state can engage in-criminal punishment and banishment).

14.

See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).

15.
See Stumpf, supra note 10, at 1613-16; Morales, supra note 13, at 1260-61 (observing
that a core objection to the "dissolution of the boundaries between separate criminal and immigration
spheres" has been "the way that this move enables the magnification of the coercive force deployed
against migrants").
See infra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text.
16.

17.

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360-64 (2010) (describing the expansion of immi-

gration consequences based on criminal convictions); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.

469, 482-86 (2007).
18. Stumpf, supra note 10, at 1581-84, 1600-07.
19.

See Jorge M. Chavez & Doris Marie Provine, Race and the Response of State Legislatures

to Unauthorized Immigrants, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 78, 78-92 (2009) (finding
that conservative citizen ideology appears to be the factor that most drives anti-immigrant state
legislation); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A

Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2102-07 (2013) (observing, based on an empirical analysis,
that many state and local immigration laws are the product of politicized processes rather than organic policy responses); Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption:
Discrimination, Harassment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POLY 1,
27-42 (2013) (discussing the long history of local discrimination against immigrants and document-
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ordinances aimed at making life difficult for immigrants can arise from
similar political circumstances, 20 criminal laws punishing immigrants
present a heightened concern. 2 1
Consistent with the general skepticism towards subfederal laws that
punish unlawful presence, the Supreme Court recently struck down Arizona's attempt to create two new state misdemeanors tied directly to
violations of the immigration laws.22 The Arizona decision sounded a
death knell for other state laws that had been challenged in the courts.
Injunctions soon followed for state harboring and smuggling laws. 23 These developments were not altogether surprising, given the laws' reliance
on individuals' (or their companions') immigration status as an element
of the offense.
But the Supreme Court in Arizona appeared to be concerned with
more than just prosecution for state immigration crimes. Writing for the
majority, Justice Kennedy also expressed a worry that unsupervised state
and local efforts to enforce the federal immigration laws would lead to
undue harassment of immigrants that federal officials had deprioritized
for removal. 24 In fact, the majority did something the Court does not usually do. In striking down the provision that authorized state and local
officers to make a warrantless arrest of any person they believed to be
removable from the United States, the Court proclaimed "it is not a
crime" for an immigrant to remain present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws. 25
ing a forgotten equality norm in immigration preemption); Lindsay Nash, Expression by Ordinance:

Preemption and Proxy in Local Legislation, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 243, 251-58 (2011) (discussing
how localities have invoked nuisance laws that have no explicit reference to status as a way to target
immigrant populations and express community preferences). While the doctrinal basis for striking
down state and local immigration measures has largely been the Supremacy Clause, this literature
demonstrates that courts can be skeptical of state and local immigration lawmaking and even make
preemption rulings for reasons other than a wish to aggrandize federal power.
20.
Examples include laws imposing restrictions on renting to undocumented immigrants and
limiting access to public benefits, professional licenses, and higher education. HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 73-76 (2014).
21.
See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 367-68 (1886) (invalidating San Francisco's discriminatory enforcement of a misdemeanor fire
ordinance against Chinese laundry operators noting that "in the administration of criminal justice, no
different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like
offenses").

22.

See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-03 (2012) (upholding injunction for

Section 3 on the grounds that Congress had already created a comprehensive, fully-integrated
scheme for alien registration that left no room for state regulation); id. at 2503-05 (upholding injunction of Section 5(C) based on the finding that Congress had specifically declined to impose criminal
penalties on unauthorized workers as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).

23.

United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 529-32 (4th Cir. 2013) (striking down

provisions of South Carolina's Act 69 making it a crime for an undocumented person to allow himself or herself to be transported or harbored or fail to carry an alien registration document); We Are

Am. v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 297 F.R.D. 373, 386-95 (D. Ariz. 2013) (ruling unconstitutional Maricopa County's practice of prosecuting migrants under state law for conspiring to
smuggle themselves).

24.
25.

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (discussing the dangers of Section 6 of S.B. 1070).
Id. at 2505.
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Of course, the statement that unlawful presence is not a crime was
not itself novel. The Court had frequently reached for a distinction between the civil and criminal to deny individual rights in the immigration
context. 26 But this time, the Court was appealing to the civil nature of
removability to settle a question about the appropriate role of local criminal justice actors in the enforcement of federal immigration law in a
generally rights-protective way.27 This followed on the heels of a debate
about local officers' authority that had intensified in the lead up to the
decision. 2 8 Left unchecked, state and local immigration enforcement ef-

26.

See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-51 (1984) (collecting cases where

civil nature of deportation proceedings led to denial of criminal trial protections and holding that
suppression of evidence is similarly unavailable as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in the
absence of evidence that such violations were widespread or egregious). See generally Fong Yue

Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (declaring that because deportation is not punishment for a crime, constitutional rights such as the right to trial by jury, and the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment do not attach); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 134-35 (2007) (observing how the reasoning of Fong Yue Ting has led to
denial of procedural protections to immigrants in removal proceedings). In recent years, scholars
have begun to take aim at the untenable nature of characterizing immigration as a purely civil matter.
See, e.g., Cesar Cuauhtdmoc Garcia HernAndez, Immigration Detention As Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1346, 1346 (2014) (challenging the conventional understanding of immigration detention as a
form of civil confinement through historical examination of immigration detention legislation's
punitive goals); Legomsky, supra note 17, at 476-500 (discussing the asymmetric incorporation of
criminal law doctrine and enforcement norms in deportation proceedings); Peter L. Markowitz,

Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1332-50 (2011) (arguing that Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), marked the beginning of a reconceptualization of deportation as
neither truly civil nor truly criminal).

27.

See also Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (noting, in discussion of Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070,

that "[dietaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise constitutional
concerns").
28.
After the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued a memorandum in the
wake of September 11th reversing a longstanding view that local police did not have the authority to
make arrests based on civil removability, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen.
on Non-Preemption of the Auth. of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to Arrest Aliens for
Immigration
Violations
to
the
Att'y
Gen.
(Apr.
3,
2002),
available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf, state and local governments began taking a
more active role in immigration enforcement, initially at the invitation of the federal government,
and then, later, on their own. Jennifer M. Chac6n, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism,
21 WM.& MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 598-606 (2012) (tracing states and localities' increased participation in immigration policy and enforcement over the past two decades); Anil Kalhan, The Fourth
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1137, 1161-65 (2008) (describing federal-local collaborations in immigration enforcement, and state
and local governments' own statutes, ordinances, and orders seeking to involve officers in immigration enforcement); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6

U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085-88 (2004) (critiquing early efforts by the federal government to
enlist state and local officials in immigration enforcement).
By the time Arizona submitted its brief, the State was asserting that states had inherent
authority to enforce federal immigration laws, both civil and criminal. Brief for Petitioners at 42-46,

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (Feb. 6, 2012) (No. 11-182). The State noted cases from
the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits that apparently authorized detentions by state and
local officials based solely on suspected unlawful presence. Id. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
had concluded that states had no such authority, though it did note an earlier case that permitted
Arizona officials to arrest an individual for a criminal immigration violation. United States v. Arizo-

na, 641 F.3d 339, 362 (9th Cir. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Part ofthe
confusion may have been caused by dicta in the Supreme Court's INS v. Lopez-Mendoza decision
suggesting that "remaining unlawfully in [the U.S.]" could be considered "itself a crime." 468 U.S.

at 1038.
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forts had caused widespread racial profiling, illegal detentions, and other
individual rights violations. 2 9
The Arizona decision therefore had a tangible, positive impact on
communities threatened by state and local involvement in immigration
enforcement in a post-2012 world.30 While the Court left a critical gap in
its protection of racial minorities by failing to invalidate Section 2(B) of
S.B. 1070,31 advocates and scholars managed to leverage the decision in
other ways, for example, by arguing that even detention by local officials
on an immigration detainer was unlawful.3 2 Arizona thus represented an
important milestone.
Proxy criminalization, however, undermines both the Supreme
Court's disapproval of the creation of state immigration crimes and its
circumscription of the role of state and local police in making arrests
based on suspected unlawful presence. Regarding the former, proxy
criminalization offers states a way to criminalize migration all the same
through facially neutral laws that nominally target conduct. Regarding
the latter, state and local governments' ability to enact measures that
criminalize immigrants' subsistence allows them to rely on their own
police powers to conduct arrests.
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in this area can be undermined because they are themselves unstable. Decades of complicated interactions between the immigration law system and the criminal law system have created a momen-

-

29.
See, e.g., Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of
FederalImmigration Laws: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, BorderSec. and Int'l Law & Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Libertiesof
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11-20 (2009) (statements of Julio Cesar Mora and
Antonio Ramirez). See generally ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE:
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 28-30 (2009),
available at http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/pftestl.drupalgardens.com/files/Khashu (2009)

The Role of Local Police.pdf.
30.
See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2012) (invalidating Maricopa County Sheriffs Office's (MCSO) practice of detaining suspected unauthorized immigrants
after loss ofthe agency's 287(g) authority in the field based, in part, on Arizona v. UnitedStates).

31.

Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509 (limiting but not invalidating Section 2(B), which requires

local law enforcement officers to investigate suspected unlawful presence during the course of
lawful stops, detentions or arrests); Chac6n, supra note 28, at 609-17 (warning that the Court's
decision to leave Section 2(B) intact cedes substantial enforcement powers to subfederal entities and
would invite discrimination and harassment of Latinos); Feranda Santos, In Arizona, Confusion on
Ruling on Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 2012, at A 12 (noting mixed reaction to Court's decision).
32.
See Christopher N. Lasch, FederalImmigration DetainersAfter Arizona v. United States,

46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 629, 673-95 (2013) (explaining how the Arizona decision undermines the
legality of detention on an immigration detainer); KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R42690, IMMIGRATION DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 19-24 (2014) (summarizing unlawful seizure
analysis and collecting decisions). On November 20, 2014, federal officials announced that they
were replacing Secure Communities with a new program based largely on notification detainers
rather than detention-based detainers. Johnson Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2. Notably, the Memorandum does not rule out detention altogether. It suggests that ICE may continue to issue requests
for detention in certain cases where a "person is subject to a final order of removal or there is other
sufficient probable cause to find that the person is a removable alien." Id.
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turn that is difficult to reverse. By 2012, immigration enforcement had
become a normalized feature of local criminal justice bureaucracies.3 3
The legacy of federal-local collaboration programs is not so easily
erased, and the persistence of jail-based programs sends a message that it
34
is business as usual when it comes to investigating unlawful presence.
Further, while federal proposals to criminalize unlawful presence have
been unsuccessful,35 federal law allows certain migration-related acts to
be criminally punished, and federal officials have been prosecuting these
offenses at an unprecedented rate. 36 As Hiroshi Motomura has observed,
if police authority to enforce the federal criminal immigration provisions
is accepted, then as a practical matter, state and local officers unable to
distinguish between mere unlawful presence and probable cause of unlawful entry or other "immigration crimes" will continue to target undocumented immigrants for arrest and detention.37
Ultimately, the reach of state and local powers in immigration enforcement rests on legal constructions-the legally constructed line between "civil" and "criminal" and the legally constructed distinction between "immigration crimes" and "other crimes." Proxy criminalization is
both produced by these categories, in the sense that the categories give
proxy criminalization its meaning and significance, 'and confounds these
categories, since it fails to fit neatly into any of them. Given proxy criminalization's potentially far-reaching impact for immigrant communities,
a more focused study of it is long due.
B. State Driver'sLicense Schemes as Proxy Criminalization

Next, I turn to describing a paradigmatic example of subfederal
proxy criminalization in the immigration context-state driver's license
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33.
34.
See, e.g., Civil Rights Orgs Celebrate the End of S-Comm, Caution Against the Replacement "PEP-Comm" Program, CAL. IMMIGRANT POL'Y CENTER (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.caimmigrant.org/groups-celebrate-s-comm-end/ (explaining how the Administration's
new Priority Enforcement Program continues to entangle local law enforcement in immigration
enforcement); see also Anjana Malhotra, The Immigrant and Miranda, 66 SMU L. REv. 277, 327-

35 (2013) (explaining how the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, or SCAAP, creates financial incentives for state and local officials to engage in immigration screening).
35.
See, e.g., Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,

H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 203 (2005) (proposing new legislation which would have made it a misdemeanor offense to be present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws).
36.
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLuM. L. REV. SIDEBAR

135, 142-43 (2009); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281-83
(2010); Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of Federal Immigration Crimes: Unlawful Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RES. CENTER: HISPANIC TRENDS (Mar. I 8,
2014), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/.
37.
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State

and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1825 (2011). Others have
challenged the notion that police can be assumed to have authority to enforce the criminal provisions
of federal immigration law. See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position:
Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.

REV. 965, 977-78 (2004); Wishnie, supra note 28, at 1090-93. The Supreme Court specifically did
not reach this issue in Arizona. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2509-10 (2012).
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schemes. I have selected state driver's license schemes as a focus for
several reasons. First, the structure of state driver's license schemes provides a useful illustration of how proxy criminalization works. Rather
than criminalizing status itself, state laws criminalize conduct (i.e., driving without a license) that, by virtue of their status, undocumented immigrants as a group must by and large engage in. Second, there is already
growing public consciousness that driver's license laws can act to criminalize undocumented communities, 3 8 though detailed legal study of this
phenomenon has been limited. Finally, unlike subfederal efforts to criminalize immigration that have received the lion's share of scholarly attention in recent years, criminalization of undocumented status through
driver's license schemes is occurring in the vast majority of states rather
than being concentrated in only a few states. 39
State driver's license schemes are already understood by many to be
an important battlefront for immigration issues at the local level.4 0 In the
past few years, nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico
have passed measures extending eligibility for driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants.4 1 Campaigns to grant immigrants access to
driver's licenses revealed how licenses have come to represent much
more than a permission slip to drive. For example, supporters have spoken about the significance of the license as a symbol of belonging and a
source of personal security.42 And the Los Angeles Times called California's move last year to allow undocumented immigrants to receive li38.
39.
40.

See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
Kevin R. Johnson, Driver's Licenses and UndocumentedImmigrants: The Future of Civil

Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 215-23 (2004) (describing how access to driver's licenses has become
a primary civil rights concern for the Latino community); Maria Pab6n L6pez, More Than A License
to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver's Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91,
126-27 (2005) (calling driver's license restrictions "a civil rights issue among noncitizens").
41.
The states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Mary-

land, Nevada, and Vermont. Assemb. 60, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); S. 13-251, 69th
Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.R. 6495, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
2013); S. 69, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015); H.R. 1007, 28th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2015); S. 957, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (111. 2013); S. 715, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2013); S. 303, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013); S. 38, 2013-2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Vt. 2013); see also D.C. 20-275, 2013-2014 Council of the D.C., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2013); P. de C.
900, 17th Legis. Assemb., Ist Sess. (P.R. 2013). Washington, New Mexico and Utah previously
allowed undocumented immigrants to obtain driver's licenses. Some of the above states issue special
or temporary licenses or driving privilege cards to those not able to show lawful presence. This has
prompted criticism from advocates who fear that any distinguishing feature on licenses can draw
attention to the fact that their holders are undocumented. See, e.g., Ruben Navarrette, Don't Meddle

With

Driver's

Licenses

for

Undocumented,

CNN

(May

13,

2014,

7:51

AM),

http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/opinion/navarrette-immigration-licenses/.
42.
See, e.g., Mary E. O'Leary, 2,000 Attend New Haven Hearingon Bill to Give Licenses to
Undocumented,
NEW
HAVEN
REGISTER
(Mar.
4,
2013,
12:01
AM),
http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130304/2000-attend-new-haven-hearing-on-bill-to-givelicenses-to-undocumented (discussing statements of Carolina Bortolleto, Sen. Martin Looney and
Rev. James Manship); Becca Heller, Legislature Extends Md. Driver's Licenses for Immigrants
Here
Illegally,
MARYLAND
REPORTER
(Apr.
7,
2013),
http://marylandreporter.com/2013/04/07/legislature-extends-md-drivers-licenses-for-immigrantshere-illegally/ (discussing statement of Del. Joseline Pena-Melnyk).
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censes a step forward "in the long campaign to decriminalize [immigrants'] day-to-day lives." 43

But state driver's licenses did not start out having such significance
in the struggle for immigrants' rights. The first state driver's license laws
date back to the early 1900s and were enacted to establish standards for
who was fit to be on the road." Eligibility criteria focused on public
safety considerations and included age, physical capacity to drive, driving competency, and knowledge of traffic laws.45 For safety reasons, the
original idea was to license all drivers who would be on the road.46
Though driving is characterized as a "privilege," the conventional wisdom was that a driver's license should be granted to anyone fit to be on
the road.47
The ubiquity of the license eventually led to its prominence as a
primary form of identification in American society.4 8 It was this feature
of driver's licenses, and not a concern for road safety, that led policymakers to start to see licenses as a "benefit" that should be denied to undocumented immigrants.4 After nearly a century without restrictions on
driver's license eligibility based on immigration status, in the early
1990s, states began to require applicants to demonstrate authorized presence in the United States to receive a license.o
In 1993, as nativist sentiment swept the country,5 ' California became one of the first states to disallow undocumented residents from
obtaining licenses.52 Proponents of the measure expressed alarm that the
license might serve as a "breeder document" to allow immigrants to
qualify for other public services and programs; they noted openly their
hope that the denial of driver's licenses would "act as a deterrent to illegal immigration."5 3 For its part, the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) questioned whether it was their role to enforce federal

43.
Richard Winton, Hector Becerra & Kate Mather, Driver's Licenses for Undocumented
Immigrants Stir Debate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-Indrivers-license-for-undocumented-immigrants-stir-debate-201 30913-story.html.
44.
L6pez, supra note 40, at 108-09.

45.

Id

46.

Johnson, supra note 40, at 220.

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.

50.
See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
51.
See Johnson, supra note 40, at 215. This same wave would be responsible for California's
Proposition 187 in 1994. Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens As Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition

187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1450-51 (1995) (discussing the "inflated rhetoric" about "'illegal' aliens" and coded racial appeals that preceded the
referendum); Johnson, supra note 40, at 218-19 (observing that California's bid to deny immigrants
driver's license came shortly before voters approved Proposition I87).

52.
S. 976, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
53.
S. B. Analysis, S. 976, 1993-1994 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Sept. 10, 1993), CA B. An., S.B.
976 Sen., 9/10/1993 (Westlaw) (quoting sponsors of S.B. 976).
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immigration laws.54 Notwithstanding objections that it would lead to
many more unlicensed drivers on the road, the legislature passed the bill
and it was signed into law.55
California's rationales for restricting driver's license eligibility had
traction, and other states soon followed suit. Over the next decade, numerous states began requiring their residents to demonstrate lawful presence before receiving a driver's license.56 Others that did not explicitly
require proof of lawful presence nevertheless required applicants to submit a Social Security number to obtain a license. This operated as a de
facto ban on undocumented immigrants receiving driver's licenses since
individuals not authorized to work in the United States are not eligible
for a Social Security number.58 In addition to driver's licenses, state motor vehicles offices were also offering non-driver identification cards for
residents who could not drive. 59 States restricted eligibility for these documents based on immigration status as well.o
Restrictions on driver's license and non-driver identification card
eligibility for immigrants peaked after the September 11th attacks. 6 1 Public debate focused on the fact that the hijackers apparently had United
States driver's licenses.62 It is far from clear whether the hijackers needed driver's licenses to carry out the attacks.63 But for many people, it was
problematic enough that driver's licenses allowed the hijackers to "blend
in[]" with the rest of society.

54. Assemb. Comm. on Transp. B. Analysis, S.B. 976, 1993-1994 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
Aug. 16, 1993), CA B. An. S.B. 976 Assem. 8/16/1993 (Westlaw); S. Transp. Comm. B. Analysis,
1993-1994 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. Apr. 14, 1993), CA B. An. S.B. 976 Sen. 4/14/1993 (Westlaw).
55.
S. 976, 1993-1994 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1993).
See, e.g., S. 1009, 43rd Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 1997); S. 1, 59th Gen. Assemb., 2d
56.
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1994); S. 89, 2002 Leg., Ist Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2002).
57.
L6pez, supra note 40, at 105-06.
58.
20 C.F.R. § 422.104(a) (2015) (listing classes of persons who may be assigned a Social
Security number). Some believe that federal law requires driver's license applicants to present a
Social Security number. To the contrary, states may require applicants to provide the Social Security

numbers, if they have them. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.

§§

405(c)(2)(C)(i), 666(a)(13) (2015) (discussing

procedures requiring the Social Security number of applicants to be recorded for child support enforcement purposes).
59.
See L6pez, supra note 40, at 99.

60.
61.
62.

Id. at 96.
Id.
Deborah Sharp, Immigrants Encounter Red Lights at DMVs, USA TODAY (May 9, 2002,

Jude Joffe8:05 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/10/drivers-usat.htm;
Block, How 9/11 Changed our Driver's Licenses, FRONTERAS: THE CHANGING AMERICA DESK
(Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/how-9 11 -changed-our-drivers-licenses.
Margaret D. Stock, Driver's Licenses and National Security: Myths and Reality, 10
63.
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 422, 424-25 (2005) (noting that the hijackers did not need driver's licenses to board commercial aircraft, since they all had passports).
Sharp, supranote 62.
64.
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The distorting lens of national security65 thus fueled further restrictions on the eligibility of immigrants to obtain driver's licenses. Several states passed laws restricting access to driver's licenses in their own
jurisdictions during this period. 6 In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID
Act, which mandated strict, uniform standards for driver's license and
state identification cards used to board commercial flights and enter federal buildings. 67 One of these standards was the requirement to show
lawful immigration status.
Thirty-eight out of fifty states currently restrict or effectively restrict
undocumented immigrants' ability to obtain a driver's license. 69 A sur-

vey of state laws reveals that most states that restrict eligibility for driver's licenses on this basis also make it a misdemeanor to operate a motor
vehicle without a valid license.o Several states go further, subjecting
65.
Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1832 (2007) (describing how national security rhetoric
has led to distortions in immigration policy).

66.

See, e.g., H.R. 188, 2002 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2002); S. 2182, 2002 Leg., Reg.

Sess. (Miss. 2002); Raquel Aldana & Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, "Aliens" in our Midst Post-9/II:

Legislating Outsiderness Within the Borders, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1683, 1711-12 (2005). Louisiana passed the "Prevention of Terrorism on the Highways Act," which made it a misdemeanor for a
person to "operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating that the person
is lawfully present in the United States." S. 89, 2002 Leg., Ist Extraordinary Sess. (La. 2002). The
law was eventually held to be preempted by federal law. State v. Sarrabea, 126 So. 3d 453, 465 (La.

2013).
67.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 30301-30308 (2015)) [hereinafter REAL ID Act].
68.
REAL ID Act, § 202(c)(2)(B). "Lawful status" is defined at 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2015). The
REAL ID Act makes a preemption challenge to the denial of access to driver's licenses by undocumented immigrations more difficult because the Act invites states to condition license eligibility by
status. However, complying states also have the option to make licenses available to undocumented

immigrations, so long as they are marked. REAL ID Act

§

202(d)( 11); cf Shirley Lin, States of

Resistance: The REAL ID ACT and Constitutional Limits upon Federal Deputization of State Agen-

cies in the Regulation of Non-Citizens, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 329, 337-38 (2009) (noting that the
requirement to specially mark licenses provided to undocumented immigrants nevertheless draws
states, some unwillingly, into the business of screening and classifying noncitizens).
69.
See State Laws & Policies on Driver's License for Immigrants, NAT'L IMMIGR. L.
CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/driverlicensemap.htmi (last updated July 1, 2015).
70.
This was originally to encourage every driver to take the requisite tests and obtain a driver's license. Thirty-six of the forty states make driving without a license a misdemeanor offense.

ALA. CODE § 32-6-18(a) (2014); ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.15.011, 28.15.281, 28.90.010(a) (2014)
(specifying penalty); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-16-602, 27-14-301 (2015) (specifying penalty); FLA.
STAT. §§ 322.03(1), 322.39 (2010) (specifying penalty); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-20(a), 40-5-121(a)
(2014); IND. CODE § 9-24-18-1(a) (2015); IOWA CODE §§ 321.174(1), 321.482 (2015) (specifying
penalty); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-235(a), (e) (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 186.410(1), 186.990(3)
(West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:52, 32:57 (2014) (specifying penalty); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
29-A, § 1251(l)(A) (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 10, 23 (2014); MICH. COMp. LAWS §§
257.301(1), 257.901 (2015) (specifying penalty); MINN. STAT. §§ 171.02, 171.241 (2015) (specifying penalty); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-1-5 (2014); MO. REV. STAT. § 302.020 (2014); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 61-5-102(l) (West 2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-484(1)(a), 60-4,111 (2015) (specifying
penalty); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-10 (West 2015); N.Y. VEH.
& TRAF. LAW § 509(1), (11) (McKinney 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-7(a), 20-35(al) (2014)
(specifying penalty); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.02(A)(1) (West 2014) (specifying no jail unless
multiple offenses); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 6-303(A) (2014); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-11-18(a) (2014);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-1-440 (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-12-22 (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
55-50-301(a)(1), 55-50-603 (2014) (specifying penalty); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.021,
521.461 (2013) (specifying penalty, no jail unless multiple offenses); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-300
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drivers to felony punishment in some cases-drivers are either cited under statutes penalizing driving while their licenses are revoked or suspended,7 1 or state law makes it a felony to drive without a license after
the third or subsequent convictions.72
Proxy criminalization works by punishing conduct that-whether
by operation of law or other circumstance-an identifiable group of individuals must regularly engage in for social or economic survival. The
Ninth Circuit recently recognized, also in a case arising out of Arizona,
that "[a]s a practical matter, the ability to drive may be a virtual necessity" for residents who are working.73 This is true not only of Arizona but
for many other places as well.74 By excluding immigrants from being
able to obtain a driver's license, the government does not deter them
from driving. 75 Instead, states force them to risk arrest or a criminal citation for engaging in an everyday activity needed to survive.
State and local law enforcement agents have taken advantage of this
state of affairs to investigate, arrest, and detain undocumented immigrants.76 These enforcement actions have little relation to road safety.
Instead, driver's license schemes became an immigration enforcement
tool of choice for police agencies and sheriff's offices around the country

(West 2014); W. VA. CODE §§ 17B-2-l(a)(1), 17B-5-1 (2015) (specifying penalty); WIS. STAT. §
343.05(3)(a), (5)(b)(1) (2015) (specifying no jail unless multiple offenses); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 317-106(a), § 31-7-136 (2014) (specifying penalty).
Three states-Arizona, Oregon and Pennsylvania-treat driving without a license as a
civil or summary offense, but undocumented immigrants can still effectively be arrested. ARIZ. REV.

STAT. ANN. §§ 28-3151(A), 28-121(B), 28-1595(B) (2015) (specifying that a driver not licensed
who fails to show qualifying ID is guilty of a misdemeanor); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 807.010(l), (4),
807.570 (2015) (describing how an officer can detain to verify identity of anyone who fails to present license); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1501(a), (d), 6304 (2014) (specifying that officer can arrest).
Only one out of the forty states appeared to treat driving without a license as a civil moving offense

without the possibility of arrest. N.D. CENT. CODE

§§

39-06-01, 39-06.1-09 (2013).

Memorandum from Daniel Morales, Joanne Lin & Chris Rickerd to Alejandro Mayorkas,
71.
Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., on Driving Without License Felonies and Deferred

Action

Eligibility

I

&

n.3

(Jan.

23,

2015),

available

at

(explaining
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/felony driving convictions_1-23-15.pdf
that in those jurisdictions, drivers without licenses are treated as having their licenses "revoked"
upon the first stop).

72.
73.

Id. at 2-3.
Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that

Arizona's denial of driver's licenses to DACA recipients may violate the Supremacy Clause because
federal law intended them to be able to work, but declining to reach the question due to its holding
that Arizona's policy violated the Equal Protection Clause by treating DACA recipients differently
than other immigrants with deferred action).
Aldana & Lazos Vargas, supra note 66, at 1709-10 (explaining how driving rises to the
74.
level of necessity in many areas where immigrants live); Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes or No Answer:

A Plea to End the Oversimplification ofthe Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. & POL. 435, 448
(2008) (discussing the unavailability of public transportation and noting that it is often difficult, if
not impossible, to function without a car).
Odegaard, supra note 74, at 448.
75.
76.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note I and accompanying text.
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interested in exacting retribution from undocumented immigrants, allowing racially motivated traffic stops to flourish.77

'

After the Obama Administration announced the DACA program in
2012, a move that was met with overwhelming voter support that election season,'7 state legislatures started to enact the first measures in two
decades to roll back restrictions on driver's license eligibility for immigrants. 79 The vast majority of states also confirmed they would extend
eligibility for driver's licenses to recipients of deferred action under the
program.so It is unclear, though, if this trend to integrate immigrant populations into the fabric of local communities will continue, given the current political climate. 8
77.
See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor, Town of East Haven 8-10 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthavenfindletter_12-19-Ill.pdf
(describing
police department's practice of patrolling locations where Latinos congregated and following vehicles with a Latino driver in an attempt to enforce immigration laws); Letter from Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Clyde B. Albright, Alamance Cnty. Att'y, et al. 4-

5

(Sept.

18,

2012),

available

at

http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/1 71201291812462488198.pdf
(describing
Alamance
County Sheriffs Office's discriminatory traffic enforcement and checkpoint practices and referring
to one deputy who said "he stopped a Latino man because 'most of them drive without licenses"'
(quoting Alamance County Sheriffs Office deputy)); see also Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen,
More Deportations Follow Minor Crimes, Data Shows, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2014, at Al (finding
that two-thirds of the nearly two million deportations during the Obama administration involved
individuals who had only a minor traffic violation, or no criminal record at all).
78.
See Loren Collingwood, Matt A. Barreto & Sergio I. Garcia-Rios, Revisiting Latino

Voting: Cross-Racial Mobilization in the 2012 Election, 67 POL. RES. Q. 632 (2014); Lynn Vavreck,
It's Not Too Late for Republicans to Win Latino Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/upshot/its-not-too-late-for-republicans-to-win-latinovotes. html?abt=0002&abg= 1.
79.
See supranote 41 and accompanying text.
80.
Nat'l Immigration Law Ctr., Are IndividualsGrantedDeferredAction Under the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for Driver's Licenses?, NILC.ORG,
http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated June 19, 2013). Because state restrictions
on driver's license eligibility are typically linked to unlawful presence and the lack of a Social Security number, and DACA recipients have lawful presence (though not lawful status) and work authorization, they are in a different position than undocumented immigrants who do not have deferred
action. Arizona and Nebraska were notable exceptions, though DACA recipients in those states can
now receive licenses. See Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 81 F. Supp. 3d 795, 799 (D. Ariz.
2015) (granting permanent injunction against Arizona's denial of driver's licenses to DACA grantees); Griselda Nevarez, NebraskaEnds Ban on Driver 's Licensesfor Young Immigrants, NBC NEWS
(May 28, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/nebraska-ends-ban-driverslicenses-young-immigrants-n366136. Georgia recently made news with introduction of a bill that
would take driver's licenses away from DACA recipients, though the bill was eventually defeated.
Aaron Morrison, Immigration Reform 2015: Georgia Lawmakers Defeat Driver's License Ban For
Undocumented Immigrants Under Obama Relief INT'L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015, 4:38 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-2015-georgia-lawmakers-defeat-drivers-license-banundocumented-I1865552.
81.
For example, the President's expansion of administrative relief to undocumented parents
in the Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA) program was met with strong opposition.
Muzaffar Chishti, Faye Hipsman & Bethany Eberle, Policy Beat: As Implementation Nears, U.S.
Deferred Action Programs Encounter Legal, Political Tests, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (Feb. I 1,
2015),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/implementation-nears-us-deferred-action-programsencounter-legal-political-tests. That states would have to provide driver's licenses to recipients of
deferred action is one of bases on which U.S. District Court Judge Andrew Hanen recently found
they have standing in the legal challenge to DAPA and Administration's expansion of DACA. Texas
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C. Diagnosingthe Harms ofProxy Criminalization
In Part II.A above, I explained that proxy criminalization is undermining some of the gains of recent decisions limiting the role of state and
local participation in the immigration arena. Reconceptualizing state
driver's license schemes as a form of proxy criminalization also makes it
easier to see some of the other harms associated with proxy criminalization. In this section, I discuss the multiple and complex harms of subfederal proxy criminalization of migration. In addition to the human costs,
proxy criminalization contributes to the notion that immigrants should be
viewed with suspicion in general and outcast from local communities at
the expense of real policy solutions.
Of course, the enforcement of laws that criminalize the subsistence
activities of undocumented immigrants has direct impacts on immigrants' lives. An individual who is cited or arrested for a violation of
driving without a license can incur substantial criminal fines. Enforcement also carries a possibility of jail time in many states 82 and the prospect of temporary separation from one's family and community. Arrest
83
can then serve as a pipeline to deportation and permanent separation.
Proxy criminalization is also harmful because it brands immigrants
as deviant for conduct that is not deviant, 84 whether or not they spend
any time incarcerated for the offense. The mark of criminality becomes
a form of local community self-definition, cementing immigrants' outsider status. 86 In the process of defining who is "in" and who is "out," the
law also constructs the undocumented immigrant identity.87 Individuals
v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 616-25 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2015) (No. B-14-254). The United
States has taken an appeal of Judge Hanen's injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing the United States'
motion to stay the preliminary injunction).
82.
See supra note 70.
83.
See supra notes 28, 34; see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809,
826-33 (2015) (explaining, inter alia, how arrests have increasingly become a tool for immigration
screening and enforcement).
84.
See Chac6n, supra note 65, at 1886 (noting that criminalization of immigrants makes it
"even harder to distinguish between those who pose a genuine threat to personal security and those
who are merely trying to survive").
85.
Though most states treat driving without a license as a misdemeanor rather than a felony,
carrying little or no jail time, misdemeanors can still have significant branding effects. Cf Issa
Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY
351, 351-93 (2013) (detailing how misdemeanor justice can exert social control); Jenny Roberts,
Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 277, 285-89 (2012) (describing the impact of misdemeanor convictions on defendants and their families).
86.
In her influential piece, The Crimmigration Crisis, Juliet Stumpf discusses how criminal
law and immigration law can both serve membership gatekeeping functions. Juliet Stumpf, The
CrimmigrationCrisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 396-402
(2006); see also Rick Su, Local Fragmentationas Immigration Regulation, 47 Hous. L. REV. 367,
372-73 (2010) (observing that local immigration regulations can be a way by which communities
define themselves).
Cf MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
87.

MODERN AMERICA 58-64 (2004) (describing the process by which the "illegal immigrant" subject
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falling within this definition are reduced to the sum of their immigration
transgressions and "crimes," and their existence is problematized across
settings.88

The stigmatizing impact of proxy criminalization, combined with
the tangible consequences for immigrants, has led to reduced civic participation of some immigrants in their communities. Though many immigrants will drive without a license to go to work, for example, they
may otherwise try to refrain from being on the roads out of fear of arrest.89 They are literally kept inside by criminalization, hidden from public view. Driver's license schemes can thus constitute a powerful way by
which states assert dominance over noncitizens, altering their movements
and very existence. 90
In a new book, Charles Epp, Steven Maynard Moody, and Donald
Haider-Markel explain how driving can be understood as a marker of
democratic citizenship. 91 Driving has become a prerequisite to freedom,
essential to participation in the social and economic life of one's community; and it has special meaning for racial minorities who were historically deprived of mobility in various ways.92 The criminalization of
driving for undocumented immigrants substantially limits their access to
these aspects of democratic citizenship.
Finally, the perversion of the criminal justice system for immigration control ends fuels misperceptions about migrant criminality. Public
discourse around immigration has already become "dominated by the
trope of criminality." 93 When immigrants are reimagined as criminals for
engaging in everyday activities, this-together with enforcement of the
laws through arrests, citation, and incarceration-generates a feedback
loop and validates the public's fears.94 The notion that immigrants com-

was constructed in early 20th century America, noting that the "illegal alien" became "something of
a specter, a body stripped of individual personage.... both fulfilling and fueling nativist discourse").
88.
Cf Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 81 (1998) ("The process of criminalizing the immigrant and her dreams is multistepped. First the immigrant is labeled a problem through demonization, then she is dehumanized,
until at last her actions or conditions are criminalized.").
See SARAH E. HENDRICKS, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., LIVING IN CAR CULTURE
89.
at
available
(2014),
3-6
LICENSE
A
WITHOUT
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/livingincarculture-without-a-license_

3.pdf.
90.
L6pez, supra note 40, at 111-12 (discussing Michel Foucault's theory of power and
applying it to state restrictions on driver's license eligibility).
CHARLES R EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
91.
CITIZENSHIP, 17-19 (2015) (discussing traffic stops of African Americans and, to a lesser extent,
other people of color).

92.

Id.

93.

Jennifer M. Chac6n, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

613, 629 (2012).
Chacon, supra note 36, at 146 (describing how enforcement efforts can generate a feed94.
back loop of popular pressure that drives even greater enforcement).
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mit more crime has been empirically disproven. 9 5 Nevertheless, proxy
criminalization helps ensure that the myth persists-because the definition of crime itself has been altered. John Hagan, Ron Levi, and Ronit
Dinovitzer explain how this type of linking of crime and immigration can
affect a type of symbolic violence by which immigrants come to be
viewed as inherently delinquent. 96
Indeed, proxy criminalization may be more concerning than direct
criminalization because the role of the state in conflating immigrants and
crime is obscured. A state can claim that it is merely trying to address the
criminal externalities of migration. When criminalization operates on a
subconscious level, we are less likely to resist it.97 The state avoids legal
scrutiny and the public is left with unchallenged internalized associations
of immigrants with disorder.
Ultimately, proxy criminalization of migration affects more than
just immigrants and their families. In the case of driver's license laws,
internalized associations have taken on a racialized image-the prototypical traffic misdemeanant becomes a Latino/a immigrant who is driving
without a license. 98 Proxy criminalization thus becomes a way by which
the law reaffirms racial salience and racial hierarchy. 99
Certainly, there are moments of dissonance. Campaigns by immigrants' rights groups, typically around individual cases, have prompted
reflection about the "criminal" label and how it is being deployed. But on
the whole, proxy criminalization has helped to legitimate a host of state
practices towards immigrants and minorities, from police harassment to
the erosion of procedural rights and deprivation of liberty, that the public
might otherwise find intolerable. In the next section, I explore what lessons we can learn from the experience of another group that has been

95.
See Rub6n G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (June 1, 2006),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debunking-myth-immigrant-criminality-imprisonmentamong-first-and-second-generation-young.
96.
John Hagan, Ron Levi & Ronit Dinovitzer, The Symbolic Violence of the CrimeImmigrationNexus: Migrant Mythologies in the Americas, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 95, 97-

99 (2008); see also Jeff Ferrell, Cultural Criminology, 25 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 395, 405 (1999) (describing how cultural criminalization may be an "end in itself, successfully dehumanizing or delegitimating those targeted, though no formal legal charges are brought against them").
97.
See Nash, supra note 19, at 265-66 (explaining how the targeting of immigrants through
nuisance regulation facilitates implicit bias by labeling their ways of living as quality-of-life diminishing, leveraging and validating pre-existing negative associations with immigrant communities).
98.
See supra note 77.
99.
See also Jamie Longazel, Moral Panic as Racial DegradationCeremony: Racial Stratification and the Local-Level Backlash against Latino/a Immigrants, 15 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 96, 96
(2013) (describing passage of Hazelton ordinance as perpetuating racial stratification). This process
is not entirely different from the process by which states, through Black Codes, criminalized African-Americans for engaging in ordinary actions that were legal for white people. See, e.g., David F.
Forte, Spiritual Equality, the Black Codes and the Americanization of the Freedmen, 43 LOY. L.

REV. 569, 600-)1 (1998).
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subject to persistent proxy criminalization at the local level-the homeless-and how courts have analyzed their claims.
II. PROXY CRIMINALIZATION AS UNDERSTOOD THROUGH COURTS'
EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF LOCAL LAWS TARGETING THE
HOMELESS

It is perhaps not surprising that proxy criminalization is often carried out against groups at the center of local political debates who themselves have limited political power (at least in a conventional sense).
Because the group being targeted is often perceived as being undesirable
or imposing a burden, communities may disguise criminalization as a
neutral response to local concerns or public safety, making it harder to
recognize. It is useful, then, to examine how other groups and their advocates have framed their objections to proxy criminalization and, specifically, how they have described proxy criminalization's relationship to
overt or direct criminalization based on status.
Over the past few decades, advocates for the homeless have been
able to gain some ground arguing that local ordinances that criminalize
sitting, lying, sleeping, or camping in public spaces are tantamount to
criminalizing homelessness itself. The cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from criminally punishing individuals based on a status or condition. 00 Therefore,
these advocates contend, the enforcement of laws that render these necessary, life-sustaining activities of homeless persons criminal are unconstitutional.101
In both the immigration and the homelessness context, direct criminalization based on status is generally impermissible. In both contexts,
states and localities have responded by passing measures that have the
veneer of punishing conduct rather than status. Some courts evaluating
the claims of homeless persons, however, have been willing to look past
the conduct/status distinction, particularly where a locality has played a
role in leaving the homeless with no option but to sleep outdoors. In the
remainder of this section, I provide some background on the homelessness example and review the Eighth Amendment decisions to see what
light they can shed on the phenomenon of subfederal proxy criminalization in immigration.
A. Local Responses to Homelessness
Beginning in the 1980s, cities grappled anew with the question of
how to address homeless populations within their jurisdictions.1 02 As
See infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
100.
See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
101.
102.
Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169 (1996) (describing what he calls
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with immigration, differing local contexts have led to a patchwork of
approaches,'0 3 with some jurisdictions being more hostile to the homeless
and others treating them with greater humanity.'1 Local policies have
also fluctuated over time. 05
One response to the presence of homeless populations has been the
passage of anti-camping ordinances and other measures that limit resting
or sleeping in a public space. o0The practical effect of such ordinances is
that poor people are forced to violate the law since they do not have private spaces to which they can go. When they violate the law, local police
may then subject them to questioning, searches, arrest, and fines. Enforcement of these low-level ordinances has become a major way by
which local communities manage, control, and sometimes expel poor
people out of a jurisdiction.1 07 Proponents of the measures garner support
for them by framing their motivations in the language of public safety. 0 8
In the late 1980s, the Miami Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and others brought a class action suit against the city for its
practice of harassing and arresting homeless persons in an attempt to
drive them out of public spaces.109 Four years into litigation, in 1992,
U.S. District Court Judge Clyde Atkins held in Pottinger v. City of Mi-

"[c]hronic street nuisances" as presenting "practically knotty and normatively perplexing questions
about the management of public spaces"); Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutionaland
HistoricalAnalysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 631, 646-47 (1992) (discussing the dramatic rise of homelessness in American cities in the

1980s).
103.

See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text; see also Rick Su, A Localist Reading of

Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2008) (arguing that local immigration
ordinances are "products of, and complicated by, how localism organizes and defines the powers and
interests of local governments").
104.
See Donald E. Baker, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: UnconstitutionalEfforts to Punish
the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 424 (1991) ("Local and state governmental responses to the
problems of homeless persons vary."); NAT'L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, No SAFE
PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 35-41 (2014), available at
http://www.nlchp.org/documents/NoSafePlace (describing examples of constructive approaches).
105.
Gary Blasi, And We Are Not Seen: Ideological and Political Barriersto Understanding
Homelessness, 37 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 563, 569-75 (1994) (comparing attitudes toward the

homeless in New York City in the early 1980s versus the early 1990s).
106.

Jamie Michael Charles, "America's Lost Cause": The Unconstitutionalityof Criminaliz-

ing Our Country's Homeless Population, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317-20 (2009); Donald
Saelinger, Nowhere To Go: The Impacts of City OrdinancesCriminalizingHomelessness, 13 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 545, 551-53 (2006) (describing restrictions on sleeping, sitting, or storing
property in public spaces).
107.
See Saelinger, supra note 106, at 553; see also Simon, supranote 102, at 645-47. As Rick
Su has explained with reference to immigration regulations, such measures can be understood as a
technique by which cities use the law to "demarcate, define, and enforce the role of space and community in American society." Su, supra note 86, at 372-73.
108.
See Saelinger, supra note 106, at 553-54 (describing rationales advanced for "quality of
life" ordinances and origin of public safety rationale in George Kelling and James Wilson's broken
windows theory of crime and order maintenance).
109.
Baker, supra note 104, at 457-59; Benjamin S. Waxman, Fighting the Criminalizationof
Homelessness: Anatomy of an InstitutionalAnti-Homeless Lawsuit, 23 STETSON L. REV. 467, 467-

68 (1994).
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amilt lo that the city had violated the Eighth Amendment by punishing
homeless residents for lying, sleeping, standing, or sitting in public.'" He
relied on a line of cases starting with the Supreme Court's decision in
Robinson v. California,ll2which had held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from
criminally punishing individuals based on a status or condition." 3
Though Robinson's admonition applied only to the punishment of status,
Judge Atkins found that the Eighth Amendment could also work to limit
the government's punishment of conduct that is closely associated to that
status-in this case, resting or sleeping in a public place.114
The court in Pottinger supported the connection between status and
conduct incidental to status by pointing to a concurring opinion by Justice White in a Supreme Court case that closely followed Robinson.'15 In
Powell v. Texas,1' a majority of justices voted not to overturn the conviction of a Texas resident under a statute that punished "be[ing] found
in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own."'"7 A plurality of four justices concluded in that case that
unlike Lawrence Robinson, Leroy Powell had not been punished for the
status of being an alcoholic." 8 Justice White also ruled to uphold Mr.
Powell's conviction but noted that he might have overturned the conviction under the Eighth Amendment if Mr. Powell had come forward with
evidence that his condition essentially rendered his public intoxication
involuntary. 1 9 In other words, if Mr. Powell could have persuaded Justice White that his conduct was an unavoidable consequence of his alcoholic condition, the outcome may have been different.
In the Pottingercase, Judge Atkins found that the conduct for which
homeless individuals were being punished was an unavoidable conse110.

810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992).

111.
Id. at 1562-65. The Court also ruled the practice unconstitutional on other grounds, including overbreadth and infringement on plaintiffs' right to travel. Id. at 1575-83. Prior to Pottinger,
courts had occasionally overturned vagrancy statutes on the ground that they punished a status or
condition. See id. at 1562 (collecting cases). Pottinger was the first to do so for laws that criminalize

sleeping in public. See id. at 1563.
112. 370 U.S. 660, 662, 667 (1962) (overturning the conviction of a California man who had
been found guilty of violating a statute that made it a crime "[tlo be addicted to the use of narcotics").
113.
Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1562. In Robinson, the Supreme Court found offensive the
notion that a condition or illness could be made into a criminal offense, rendering a person "continuously guilty" and subject to prosecution at any time without committing a transgression. Id. at 666
(internal quotation omitted). Though the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause is
more popularly understood as limiting how a state may punish, Robinson and its progeny address
limits of what a state may punish. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (noting that the
Eighth Amendment circumscribes the criminal process in several ways, one of which is that it "imposes substantive limits on what can be made criminal").

114.
115.
116.

Pottinger,810 F. Supp. at 1564.
Id at 1563 (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 551 (1968) (White, J., concurring)).
392 U.S. 514 (1968).

117.

Id at 517, 536-37 (discussing Mr. Powell's conviction under Texas Penal Code Art. 477).

118.
119.

Id. at 533-34.
Id at 551, 553-54 (White, J., concurring).
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quence of their condition. Sleeping, eating, standing, and congregating in
public, the court found, were essential, life-sustaining activities that class
members had no reasonable choice but to perform in public.1 2 0 To arrive
at this conclusion, the court relied on expert testimony describing the
shortage of shelter beds in the city and the social, economic, and psychological barriers homeless people faced.1 2 1 So long as the city did not have
sufficient shelter to house Miami's homeless, the court ruled, the city
could not criminalize otherwise innocent acts if doing so would be tantamount to punishing the homeless for their status. 122
Over a decade later, in Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 123 the Ninth
Circuit adopted similar reasoning to uphold an injunction prohibiting the
City of Los Angeles from enforcing an ordinance that criminalized sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets and sidewalks in the Skid Row
area.124 The court held that "so long as there is a greater number of
homeless individuals in Los Angeles than the number of available beds,"
the city could not unconditionally enforce the ordinance against them.125
Most recently, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed
a Statement of Interest in a federal case in Idaho arguing-based on
Jones-that criminalizing the homeless for sleeping in public spaces
when there is insufficient shelter space violates the Eighth Amendment. 126

One innovation in these cases is the introduction of a notion that local governments could not deny homeless populations shelter on the one
hand and criminalize the only alternative they had-sleeping in the street
and in public places-on the other. In other words, the relationship between these two acts by a local government turned the criminalization of
a homeless person's conduct into the de facto criminalization of a homeless person's status. While courts opining on the lawfulness of anticamping laws in other jurisdictions have sometimes declined to invalidate them, several have done so on grounds that the plaintiffs had not
shown an insufficiency in shelter for the homeless.12 7
120.
121.
122.
123.

Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1574.
Id. at 1564.
Id. at 1564-65.
444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007).

124.
Id. Judicial pronouncements in these cases helped to highlight the complex causes of
homelessness and the social and economic reality confronting homeless persons, leading cities to
adopt more constructive solutions through settlement. Unfortunately, criminalization continues to

this day. Paul Boden & Jeffrey Selbin, Op-Ed., Californiais Rife with Laws Used to Harass Homeless People, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0216-bodencalifomia-vagrancy-laws-target-homeless-20150216-story.html.

125.

Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138.

126.
News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Brief to Address the Criminalization of Homelessness (Aug. 6, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/justicedepartment-files-brief-address-criminalization-homelessness.

127.

See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that

Orlando's law prohibiting, inter alia, sleeping or being in a temporary shelter on public property did
not violate the Eighth Amendment because the city presented evidence of an abundance of shelter
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B. Going Beyond the Homelessness Cases
Some scholars and advocates have argued for an application of the
Robinson prohibition on the criminalization of status to additional contexts. For example, before the Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas,1 28 Claude Millman argued that sodomy statutes should be held unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because they punished conduct
closely related to status.1 29 Millman suggested that the reasoning of Justice White's concurring opinion in Powell should apply to acts that are
"elemental" or "lie at the core of the individual's status," even if they are
not, in the strict sense, involuntary.' 30 As for types of statuses that should
be protected by the Eighth Amendment, Millman again turned to Justice
White, noting that a status in this context applied to "a condition brought
about by acts remote in time from the application of the criminal sanctions contemplated, . . . relatively permanent in duration . . . [and] of
great magnitude and significance in terms of human behavior and val'

ues."' 3

Taking the homelessness cases and Millman's argument to heart,
one can see how a similar analysis might apply to local proxy criminalization of migration through state driver's license schemes. In the homelessness context, courts recognized that a local government may be
tempted to use its power to define crime to express local community
preferences by punishing the disfavored group as a "lawbreaking other."l32 When a state forces discrete groups to violate the law, in that case

space); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 846-47 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (declining to
enjoin enforcement of camping prohibition in public parks as part of San Francisco's "Matrix Program" in part because plaintiffs failed to make a substantial evidentiary showing that there was

insufficient shelter available). Cf Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1167 (Cal. 1995) (reversing ruling of Court of Appeals that Santa Ana, CA ordinance prohibiting unlawful camping
violated the Eighth Amendment rights of homeless residents, noting, among other things, that "it is
far from clear . . . [they] had [no] alternatives to either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations").

128.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

129.

Claude Millman, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.

PROBs. 267, 269 (1988). He pointed to four justices' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
202 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), where they noted that it could be cruel and unusual to
criminally punish a homosexual for an act of sodomy. Id at 267-68; see also Sheldon Bernard Lyke,
Lawrence as an Eighth Amendment Case: Sodomy and the Evolving Standards of Decency, 15 WM.

& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 633, 634-35 (2009).
130.
Millman, supra note 129, at 269 & n. 15.
131.
Id at 285 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 550 n.2 (White, J., concurring)); see
also Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (noting that even though the defendant in Robinson had voluntarily elected to take drugs at some point in the past, punishing him for the addiction
he eventually developed would have been inappropriate). Millman also noted it was important to
look at the state's interest in punishing such conduct. Millman, supra note 129, at 278, 291-94. He
argued that there were no compelling state interests furthered by sodomy statutes. Id. at 302-06.
132.
In a volume that explores the ways that LGBT people have been problematized criminalized in law and social discourse, Joey Mogul, Andrea Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock write, "[t]he very
definition of crime is socially constructed, the result of inherently political processes that reflect
consensus only among those who control or wield significant influence. It often has more to do with
preservation of existing social orders than with the safety of the larger populace." JOEY L. MOGUL,
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by failing to provide sufficient shelter space, it engages in the punishment of status through the punishment of conduct. Similarly, states force
undocumented immigrants to risk arrest and criminal sanctions by denying them drivers' licenses as a categorical matter, on the one hand, and
making it a crime to drive without a license on the other. As the Supreme
Court has stated, "possession [of a driver's license] may be[] essential in
the pursuit of a livelihood."l 33 Immigrant workers may have no realistic
choice but to get behind a wheel so they can put food on the table. Even
if driving without a license is not in a strict sense involuntary, under
Millman's framework, it is sufficiently integral to immigrants' livelihoods and existence to be "elemental," 34 just as sleeping outdoors may
be to a homeless person.
The underlying "status" at issue in state driver's license schemesundocumented immigration status-is one that should fit Justice White's
definition in Powell.'35 Though coming to the United States in violation
of immigration laws may be a voluntary act for some,'3 those voluntary
actions are usually remote in time from application of the criminal laws
relating to driving without a license. Once a person enters the United
States without status, that status can become virtually fixed and permanent.' 37 Undocumented status also carries great personal significance for
individuals who live with it and its attendant disabilities. 38
That local efforts to control homelessness and state responses to the
presence of immigrant communities might follow a similar trajectory is
probably to be expected. Both groups have, at various times, served as
easy scapegoats for jurisdictions confronted with the complex effects of
joblessness, poverty, and demographic change. Indeed, the regulation of
migrants and the poor were once formally intertwined. Early in our country's history, for example, states, having inherited the tradition of the
English poor laws, enacted various restrictions on the ability of poor

ANDREA J. RITCHIE & KAY WHITLOCK, QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT
PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvi (2011).

133.
134.

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
Millman, supra note 129, at 269.

135.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
136.
For others, it is not voluntary, but a response to persecution or severe conditions in their
countries of origin.

137.

See Immigration and Nationalitiy Act

§

245(a), 8 U.S.C.

§

1255(a) (2012) (generally

limiting those who may adjust status to that of a legal permanent resident to individuals who were
"inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States"); Why Don't They Just Get In Line?: The
Real Story of Getting a "Green Card" and Coming to the United States Legally, IMMIGR. POL'Y
CENTER
(Mar.
13,
2013),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/why dont theyget inline.pdf.
138.
See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also Roxana Kopetman, Group Fightsfor

Immigrants Living in the U.S. Illegally, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (May 5, 2014, 4:03 PM),
http://www.ocregister.com/articles/raiz-612533-immigration-members.html. (profiling the stories of
DREAMers who have grown up without status in the United States); Jose Antonio Vargas, Inside the

World of the "Illegal" Immigrant, TIME (June 14, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/14/insidethe-world-of-the-illegal-immigrant/.
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people to settle in or move between jurisdictions.1 39 The Articles of Confederation denied "paupers" and "vagabonds" the equal enjoyment of the

privileges and immunities of citizens. 140 The use of low-level ordinances
to police these populations would thus seem a natural extension of their
common history.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF PROXY
CRIMINALIZATION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION

The analysis of the homelessness cases under the Eighth Amendment suggests a way of understanding proxy criminalization that cuts
across subject matters and even areas of constitutional law. Where a govemmental jurisdiction's power to punish a group based on that group's
status or condition-whether created by operation of law or circumstance-is limited, the jurisdiction should not be permitted to elude that
limitation by criminally punishing conduct incidental to that status, particularly where the jurisdiction has a role in forcing the group to engage
in such conduct. In the immigration area, this means that states and local-

ities should not be able to use their police powers to punish undocumented immigrants for activities they must engage in for their social and economic survival simply because those laws are focused as a formal matter

on conduct and tend to be rules of general applicability. This is all the
more the case when, as with the driver's license schemes, the state has
elected to deny immigrants access to the means to engage in essential
subsistence activities lawfully.

The foregoing analysis may be applied to other forms of subfederal
proxy criminalization of immigrants as well. For example, some states
arrest and prosecute undocumented immigrants for using false documents to work under fraud, identity theft, and related statutes.141 Like
139.
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1846-59 (1993); see also Simon, supra note 102, at 635-42. Those laws
made relief for the poor the responsibility of the community where they settled, incentivizing states
to try to close their doors to migrant laborers who moved from place to place in search of work. See
Simon, supra note 102, at 637-38.
140.

Neuman, supra note 139, at 1846-47 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1871,

art. IV § 1) (internal quotation mark omitted). "[F]ugitives from justice" were also exempted. Id.
(quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1871, art. IV

§

1) (internal quotation mark omitted).

Today, "public charge" provisions in federal immigration and welfare law continue to impact poor
immigrants. See, e.g., Lisa Sun-Hee Park, Perpetuation of Poverty Through "Public Charge", 78
DENv. U. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141.
See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION: IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS PROJECT, CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF FROM REMOVAL 1-3 (2014), availa-

ble
at
https://www.actu.org/sites/default/files/assets/14 9_30_memoonstatecriminalconvictionsand
eligibilityfor administrative relief from removal.pdf; see generally John Leland, Some ID Theft is
Not for Profit, But to Get a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2006, at A5. The Immigrant Rights Clinic at
the University of California, Irvine School of Law, which I co-direct, has also joined with others to
file a lawsuit challenging workplace raids conducted by Maricopa County law enforcement officials
based on such laws. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No.
2:14-cv-01356-DGC, 2014 WL 2872310 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2014) (describing impact concerted
enforcement efforts on workers). The court granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction in January.
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driving without a license laws, the fraud and related statues generally do
not have immigration status as an element. 142 But immigrant workers
often have little choice but to use a different name or Social Security
number in order to subsist.143 In the absence of federal immigration reform, systematic enforcement of these laws against immigrants has the
effect of criminalizing workers based on their status. Unlike state driver's licenses schemes, only certain states have had a direct role in regulating businesses' verification of employees' eligibility to work through
state employer sanctions laws. But even if federal law alone creates the
conditions for proxy criminalization, enterprising state and local officials
should not be able to capitalize on those conditions to enact a punishment
scheme.
Doctrinally, this more nuanced framework for evaluating subfederal
criminal law measures that punish migration by proxy is most likely to
come into play in the evaluation of preemption claims. But current
preemption doctrine alone is insufficiently robust.1" Instead, I posit that
it is necessary to borrow developments from the Eighth Amendment cases and equal protection norms as an analytical lens to discern the right
result. While others have discussed the overlap between preemption and
-*
equal protection norms in the immigration context, 145 critical
here is the
addition of an Eighth Amendment analysis in response to states' invocation of criminal law.1 46 Crossover in the analysis of constitutional law
claims has some precedent1 47 and would be well-placed here.

Arizona v. Arpaio, No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2015 WL 1432674, at *1
2015).

(D. Ariz. Mar. 27,

142.
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 141, at 2-3.
143.
Federal law prohibits employers from hiring those who do not have authorization to work
and requires that they verify prospective employees' eligibility by checking their information and

documents. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) (2012).
144.
See supranote 10 and accompanying text. In some areas relevant to immigration, such as
with regard to driver's license regulations, the federal government has allowed for states to have a
role. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Thus, courts have generally not found state
restrictions on driver's license eligibility to be preempted unless the law applies explicitly to noncitizens. See supra note 66 (discussing Louisiana Supreme Court's invalidation of law making it a
misdemeanor for certain noncitizens to operate a motor vehicle without carrying documentation of

lawful presence); see also John Doe No. I v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369,
1375-76 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (opining that Texas's driver's license eligibility restrictions are consistent
with national policy and thus not preempted by federal law).

145.

See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 19; cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (noting

that courts "faced with an equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens . . . must be
attentive to congressional policy"); Hiroshi Montomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and

Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1730-46 (2010) (describing how equal protection
arguments of undocumented immigrants tend to be obliquely asserted through institutional competence claims like preemption).
146.
Like preemption doctrine, equal protection doctrine provides an unsatisfying answer to
proxy criminalization because laws of general applicability will be upheld absent a showing of
discriminatory intent. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977). But the main obstacle to equal protection challenges in the immigration context has been
courts' resistance to applying heightened scrutiny to laws that affect undocumented immigrants. See,
e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (noting that for equal protection analysis, undocumented status is "not
irrelevant to any proper legislative goal" but applying heightened scrutiny in that case because the
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I have discussed in detail the contribution that the Eighth Amendment cases can make. As for equal protection norms, the lack of an articulable state interest can be circumstantial evidence of invidious intent
and invalidate a law. 148 With regard to driver's licenses, there can be no
serious public safety rationale for not allowing immigrants to learn the
driving rules and be tested on their driving ability.1 4 9 The same goes for
arbitrarily subjecting them to criminal punishment for not having a license, particularly since many will drive anyway.
Notably, the framework I propose for understanding proxy criminalization here does not necessarily depend on bad motives of states in enacting criminal laws or of state and local officers in enforcing them. Indeed, some states that have driver's license schemes that punish immigrants are integrationist in other ways. There can be heterogeneity in
approaches to enforcement at the municipal level. And while many state
laws precluding undocumented immigrants from obtaining driver's licenses acted with restrictionist intent, the statutes making driving without
a license a criminal offense generally predated eligibility rules conditioned on lawful presence and were not about immigration at all. The
framework for proxy criminalization accounts for this complexity by
focusing more so than other legal analytical tools on the effect of criminalization measures on immigrants' experience. Not every punitive state
Texas law at issue was directed a children who "have little control" over their presence in the United

States); see also Sanchez v. State, 692 N.W.2d 812, 817 (Iowa 2005) (declining to apply heightened
scrutiny review to Iowa's driver's license eligibility restrictions, claiming that undocumented immigrants are not a suspect class). There have been some recent successes with equal protection challenges to policies targeting undocumented immigrants based on improper animus. See, e.g., Arizona

Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that animus theory could
support an equal protection challenge to Arizona's decision to deny driver's licenses to DACA

recipients); Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 864-67 (D. Ariz. 2015) (denying motion
to dismiss equal protection claim against state identity theft measures enacted to penalize undocumented workers). But progress is slow.
Eighth Amendment law would also likely be insufficient on its own. A challenger would
need to overcome courts' reluctance to expand the prohibition on the criminalization of status to new
contexts. See Benno Weisberg, Comment, When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the Eighth
Amendment: Applying the Robinson Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual "Crimes",96 J.

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329, 329-31 (2005) (suggesting Robinson v. California, 379 U.S. 660
(1962) may be somewhat of a dead letter but arguing for its revival in the homelessness context); see
generally Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
ConstitutionalDiscourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I11, 140-56 (2007) (expressing skepticism that the
Eighth Amendment, as presently interpreted, can be a locus of reform).
147.
See, e.g., Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L.

REV. 155, 176-78 (2014) (describing Hampton v. Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) as an example of interest-limiting noncongruence based on federalism in the equal protection context).
148.
See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267; see also Stumpf, supra note 10, at
1615 (noting that lack of empirical support for prioritizing immigrants in criminal legislation suggests that motives other than crime control underlie at least some of the subnational criminal laws
focusing on noncitizens).
In fact, studies show that licensing immigrants make the roads safer. AAA FOUND. FOR
149.
(2011),
available
at
TO
KILL
13
TRAFFIC
SAFETY,
UNLICENSED
https://www.aaafoundation.org/sites/default/files/201 I Unlicensed2Kill.pdf (reporting that unlicensed
drivers are more likely to be involved in fatal car crashes); HENDRICKS, supra note 89, at 6-8 (describing public safety benefits of licensing immigrants). No other group has been so uniformly
denied a driver's license based on reasons other than road safety.
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law is invalid simply because immigrants are also affected. But nor can
schemes that feel like criminalization because they punish conduct intimately connected to status be immune from attack.
Beyond doctrinal application, and perhaps more importantly, a better understanding of how proxy criminalization works might improve
policy decisions. To give just one example, the immigration legalization
proposal that passed out of the Senate in 2013, as well as guidance for
the DAPA program, contain clauses intending to preserve eligibility for
immigrants whose only criminal convictions are based on laws that penalize undocumented status.150 However, these clauses only apply to
state and local criminal statutes where immigration status is an essential
element, reflecting an incomplete view of the way that immigration status is criminalized at the subfederal level. 5 i Although the Administration
has released updated details on its enforcement priorities stating that officers should be sensitive to the overall circumstances of the arrest and
conviction in cases that punish immigrants for using false documents to
work, it still regards immigrants with identity theft related convictions as
presumptively falling into priority categories.152 The federal government
could go much farther in ameliorating the effects and legacy of proxy
criminalization.
CONCLUSION

As the criminal and immigration law systems evolve and interact,
our legal analytical tools must also evolve. Immigration scholars and
advocates must be willing to transcend conventional frameworks in their
own areas and look to the experience of other groups. Historically, both
immigrants and the homeless have been the target of local prejudice, and
their political marginalization means policymakers will frequently bend
to the will of the majority when making decisions about their welfare. It
makes sense that the struggle of homeless persons should yield lessons
for immigrants burdened by criminalization.

150.

Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,

113th Cong.

§

2101(b)(3)(A)(i)(1) (2013); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S.

Dep't Homeland Sec. to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement et al. on Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immi-

grants

3-4

(Nov.

20,

2014),

available

at

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/141120_memojprosecutorialdiscretion.pdf
(describing the circumstances that make an individual an enforcement priority and therefore not

eligible for DAPA).
151.
For a discussion of how these clauses fail to capture a significant number of cases where
immigrants are being penalized for their status, see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 141.

Our Immigrant Rights Clinic also sent a letter to Administration officials explaining the inadequacy
of this exception in connection with the Puente Arizona v. Arpaio case. Letter from Annie Lai et al.,
to Esther Olavarria, Senior Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't Homeland Sec. et al. (Jan. 20, 2015)
(on file with author).
Frequently Asked Questions Relating to Executive Action on Immigration, U.S. IMMIGR.
152.
& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/immigrationAction/faqs (last visited June 28,

2015).
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The same forces that have caused proxy criminalization to persist
produce excesses in other areas of the modem criminal justice system,
and confronting proxy criminalization should be part of a larger project
to tackle mass incarceration. By studying the proxy criminalization of
migration, we are reminded that it is important to pay close attention to
the lived experience of those subject to the law. When legal phenomena
are experienced as criminatization and articulated as so by impacted
communities, we can no longer ignore those voices because existing legal frameworks fail to clearly locate their illegitimacy. Only by listening
more closely can we truly begin to transform the relationship between
subordinated groups and governmental institutions in the communities
where they live.

